Many middle-income workers save for retirement through 401(k) plans. This study addresses the concern that low account balances of older workers may indicate that these vehicles are not sufficient to insure adequate retirement savings. In particular, the study shows that workers are not persistent (continuing once a worker has started) in contributing, and a weak stock market exacerbates the problem.
Have workers accumulated sufficient retirement savings? Munnell, Webb, and GolubSass (2009) find that half of U.S. workers have insufficient savings to be on track for having adequate retirement income. Scholz and Seshadri (2008) , however, using different assumptions, find a smaller percentage, but a substantial minority, to have insufficient savings. Other than Social Security, middle-income workers save for retirement largely through 401(k) plans. Thus, these findings of insufficient saving lead to a question about the adequacy of worker savings through 401(k) plans for at least some workers. The low account balances accumulated by many older workers are a direct indication of the possible insufficiency of savings through these plans.
One aspect of this issue is the persistency of worker contributions. Persistency refers to whether workers continue contributing, and for how long, once they have started. Whether workers display persistency in contributing to their 401(k) plans is important from a policy perspective. Projections of final retirement wealth, such as the two cited above, are often made using micro simulation models, which have their own set of assumptions regarding contribution persistence. If these models incorrectly assume that once a worker contributes he will contribute for the remainder of his working life, these projections will be too high, falsely indicating that workers will have adequate savings at retirement. In addition, workers who do not contribute consistently do not benefit from dollar cost averaging, which is likely to decrease rates of return on 401(k) balances, leading to even lower retirement wealth. 1 Dollar cost averaging occurs when the 401(k) participant consistently contributes the same dollar amount, regardless of 2 whether the stock market is up or down. By doing so, the participant automatically purchases more shares when the stock market is down than when it is up.
Results from behavioral economics suggest that inertia would cause workers who began contributing to their 401(k) plans to continue doing so, as long as they remained with the same employer. 2 In this paper, we investigate the power of inertia on worker pension contributions over a period of a number of years. In particular, we investigate the hypothesis that inertia would cause workers who are contributing to a 401(k) plan to continue doing so.
Inertia, sometimes called status quo bias, refers to a psychological propensity to not make changes but to continue doing what one is doing. Relating to pensions, inertia would cause contributors to continue contributing. That clearly would be the path of least resistance, since stopping contributions would require action on the individual's part. Inertia involves not making changes to a greater degree than would be predicted solely taking into account the transactions costs involved in making changes. However, it does not necessarily imply the complete absence of change. Presumably, if the incentives are sufficiently great, workers overcome inertia.
This hypothesis thus relates to the limits of the traditional model of rational behavior. It has relevance for the policy idea that automatic enrollment in defined contribution plans is a way to encourage participation in those plans because, due to inertia, workers will continue contributing once they have been enrolled. This paper uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to investigate an aspect of the issue of persistency of contributions, which is: Do workers persistently contribute to 401(k) plans over stock market cycles? 3 Because workers may stop contributing during periods of stock market decline, examining contributions over a stock market cycle may provide insight into what may be a cause of inconsistent contributions over time. The dramatic rise in the stock market 3 over the late 1990s, followed by the dramatic decline, and then the subsequent rise to all time highs, provides a particularly volatile period to examine the persistency of 401(k) contributions.
Examining persistency of worker contributions over this period may also provide insight into the savings behavior of workers. Are workers target savers, offsetting the stock market decline by investing more? Or are workers "herd investors," putting money in the stock market when it is doing well, and becoming discouraged and not contributing when it is doing poorly?
Or might workers be "inertia investors," contributing regardless of the state of the stock market?
The relative prevalence of these three types of worker-investors may have important implications for the adequacy of worker preparedness for retirement.
RESEARCH GOALS
Our research has a number of goals: 4 1) It documents the density and the persistency of workers' pension contributions. The density of contributions is the percentage of years in which the worker contributes. Persistency refers to whether workers continue contributing to their plan after they make their first contribution. It also describes how long they continue to contribute.
2) It describes how persistency varies across population groups.
3) It analyzes the variation in participation across workers using multivariate regression analysis. What factors explain why people who are covered by pensions stop contributing to them?
4) It investigates the effect of changes in the stock market over time on participation. Participation is measured by whether the worker is contributing.
5) It provides evidence on the prevalence of different types of investors among 401(k) participants.
6) It investigates the extent to which differences in pension participation across population groups are due to differences in persistence of contributions.
Based on the life cycle hypothesis, where workers reduce savings during downturns in their incomes, we hypothesize that contribution persistence, or "inertia" investing, is more likely when workers have stable earnings patterns and stable demographics-marital status, family size, and health. find that result for some changes of circumstances. We hypothesize that "herd" investing, which is an investment error, is more likely to occur among lower-income people, who presumably have less financial sophistication.
Previous research, reviewed in Turner (2003) , found that lower-educated workers were more likely to make errors in investment decisions than more highly educated workers. We hypothesize that "target" investing is more likely to occur among lower-and middle-income workers than upper-income workers because lower-and middle-income workers are more likely to be weighing trade-offs of present versus future consumption than upper-income workers, for whom savings for bequests is more likely to be where trade-offs occur.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
While simulations that project the future retirement income of workers often assume continuous years of contributions, workers may not persist in their contributions to their plans, but instead contribute intermittently. Because of family responsibilities or other reasons, workers may face times when they are either unemployed or out of the labor market. Even when workers are in the labor market, their pension contributions may vary over time due to changes in their needs, their earnings, whether their job provides a pension, the availability and generosity of employer matching contributions, or their perceptions as to the optimal timing of contributions over stock market cycles.
These effects on pension contributions may be correlated with the stock market price changes. When stock prices are low, which is a good time to buy, workers' pension contributions may also be low or cease. This could occur for several reasons. First, some workers get discouraged when the stock market is declining and stop contributing. For others, their incomes may fall, such as when work hours are reduced. Alternatively, however, if workers have a target account balance, they may vary their contributions to offset capital market changes.
These risks influence the worker's pension accumulations through their effect on the level, density, and timing of a worker's pension contributions and preretirement withdrawals.
The density of contributions is the proportion of the working life that he or she contributes to a pension.
We investigate whether variability in earnings affects the time pattern of savings in On the other hand, surveys indicate that some older people nearing their target retirement dates increase their contributions to reach their target level of savings before retirement (Mincer 2008) . Thus, the pattern may vary by the age and number of years from the expected date of retirement of the worker. Seligman and Wenger (2005) suggest that investment market returns may rise during periods of unemployment to the extent that the stock market is a leading indicator, with stock prices rising before unemployment falls. If true, unemployed workers might systematically miss opportunities to invest when equity prices are low. Their results suggest that such unemployment-related losses are larger for low-wage workers because they are more prone to job loss.
While a number of cross-sectional studies have examined determinants of pension contributions in the United States and in the United Kingdom, only a couple of studies have examined the persistency of workers' contributions over time. 5 Smith, Johnson, and Muller (2004) 
DATA
We use the PSID, a nationally representative longitudinal survey of over 9,000 families. 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
This section presents results examining the persistency of pension contributions over a stock market cycle. It examines responses to the question, "What amount or percent of pay do you voluntarily contribute currently?" Table 2 presents basic descriptive statistics on the number of workers contributing in different years. The main point to be drawn from Table 2 is that the percentage of workers contributing to a 401(k) plan is positively correlated with the DJIA, with a drop in the percentage of workers contributing in 2003, when the DJIA was at a low. This is evidence of an error in the investment pattern of some workers-not contributing when the stock market is low and contributing when the stock market is high. This pattern leads to lower accumulated assets than would be expected from a simulation that does not recognize the pattern.
Percent Currently Contributing and the Stock Market
A possible upward trend that is suggested by the increase in percentage contributing in 2005 may be due to two factors. First, the sample is getting successively older in each subsequent survey. Pension participation rates tend to increase with age. Second, the coverage rate of 401(k) plans has continued to grow over time. In addition to investigating the relationship of contribution persistence to changes in the stock market, we also examine more broadly the patterns and determinants of the persistence of contributions. In the regression analysis, we return to the issue of the effect of the stock market on contribution persistence. worked in all four sample periods and began the portion of the PSID studied as contributors. 
Density of Contributions
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Changing jobs can result in a worker who initially was able to participate in a pension plan subsequently not being able to do so. 
Persistency of Contributions
In this section, we examine the persistency of contributions to 401(k)-type plans. We define persistency as the percentage of workers contributing in a base year who continue to contribute in consecutive subsequent years.
To persist in contributing, it is necessary to persist in working. Therefore, we first examine persistency in working. Table 7 indicates that of those working in 1999, 81 percent worked all four sample years. 
Persistency of Contributions for Workers in the Same Job, by Demographic and Economic Group
In this section, we examine persistency of contributions for workers in the same job for all four panels generally, then broken down by demographic and economic group. Table 10 investigates persistency for workers in the same job. When comparing the sample of all workers in Table 8 to this table, as would be expected we see a much higher persistency with workers in the same job. Table 11 reports persistency by race. The persistency for whites over the period is consistently considerably higher than for blacks. This finding would explain lower participation 15 rates for blacks than whites and lower accumulated account balances. The sample sizes for
Hispanics and "other" races are too small to provide separate estimates. (186) and college degree (317). Note that the sample size for workers without a high school degree is too small to be of statistical value. Sample is weighted. Table 14 investigates persistency by quartile of family income. As theory would predict, higher levels of family income are consistent with higher persistency. These effects are considerably larger than the effects found for differences in education level. 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
From the analysis in Table 2 , it appears that there is a positive relationship between 401(k) participation and prices in the stock market. The marked drop in participation in 2003 coincides with the low in the stock market in that year. In this section, we present a regression model that controls for other variables that may also affect participation.
There are two goals in this section: to estimate whether the DJIA is correlated with 401(k) participation, and to examine whether the usual demographic, financial, and job-related characteristics from previous cross-sectional research continue to play a role in participation over time. Previous models of 401(k) participation have not taken into consideration the potential bias in the OLS estimates when not controlling for unobserved tastes for saving.
8,9
A General Model for 401(k) Participation
We begin with specifying a general model for 401(k) participation, and then amend the model to include our variable of interest, the DJIA.
Over the years, economists have identified numerous motives for saving, including life cycle consumption smoothing, precautionary motives, and bequest intent. These theories identify personal characteristics that may affect the saving decision, including risk aversion, future discount rate, and liquidity constraints. More recent research adds to the list by identifying other effects on the saving choice, such as financial education and/or knowledge (Bernheim and Garrett 2003; Agnew, Utkus, and Young 2007) , trust (Agnew, Utkus, and Young 2007) , lack of self control (Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman 2005) , inertia and procrastination (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian2004) , and childhood upbringing (Becker 1996) . 10 
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While some of these characteristics can be explicitly controlled for in an econometric model, many of them are unobservable or difficult to measure. 11 Hence, estimation using an unobservable effects model allows the individual unobservables to be controlled for, leading to consistent estimates. After careful consideration as to the most appropriate estimation technique, we are using fixed effects logit estimation. 12 Hence, following the notation in Wooldridge In choosing the independent variables, we look to economic theory and previous empirical models of 401(k) participation. Englehardt and Kumar (2007) develop a theoretical model of 401(k) participation that includes such demographic variables as age, race, education, marital status, number of children, and gender. Age is a proxy for the stage in the life cycle, marital status for precautionary motives (e.g., more security in marriage), and number of children for bequest motives. Furthermore, Bernheim and Scholz (1993) find that college-educated individuals are more likely to engage in more sophisticated financial planning and save more adequately for retirement.
By construction, in order for fixed-effects to control for the unobservable effects, it also differences out the time-invariant variables. Hence, we are unable to include race, gender, and education in the model. We will address the consequences of not including these variables when discussing the results.
We also control for financial variables such as family income, net wealth, and whether the person currently has another pension plan. Family income identifies the tax bracket for the family, and both family income and net wealth control for liquidity constraints. More family income may push the family into a higher tax bracket, hence providing more tax savings from participating in a 401(k) plan, increasing the probability of participating. Higher income and net wealth affords the family more liquidity to pay for current expenses; hence we expect a positive coefficient estimate on these two independent variables. Finally, economic theory suggests that having another pension plan could signal the individual as a saver, increasing the probability of participation. On the other hand, additional saving wealth could also diminish the chance of saving in another vehicle if the person is a target saver. Thus, the sign of the expected coefficient estimate is ambiguous.
Unfortunately, the PSID does not provide data on whether a nonparticipant is eligible for participation in a pension plan. Hence, we include part-time status as a control variable, since part-time employees are less likely to be eligible for a plan. 
Adding in the stock market variable
To investigate the correlation between changes in the stock market and persistency in participation and contribution rates, we add to Equation (1) a continuous variable, z t , that represents the natural log of the DJIA:
where z t varies across time, t = 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005 .
Results
We report regression results for two samples in Table 15 . In both samples, the relationship between the DJIA and the probability of participating in a 401(k) plan is positive
and statistically significant at a 1 percent level. This is true whether a worker changes jobs or remains in the same position throughout the panel. The higher the DJIA, the more likely the worker is to participate in the company 401(k) plan, even controlling for factors such as the fluctuations within the housing market.
If inertia is the driving force behind contribution decisions, the inclusion of the stock market variable should be statistically insignificant. This is not the case. Instead, workers are more likely to participate if the stock market is higher. This type of behavior can be described as "herd" investing, where individuals get into the market when it is high and get out when it is low. This is an investment error, as the worker is getting into the stock market when it is high and getting out when it is low.
As expected, the effect of family income on participation is positive and highly statistically significant. The estimate on whether the worker has another pension plan is also positive and significant at the 1 percent level. This result suggests that even after taking into account unobservable tastes for saving, workers who have one pension plan are likely to see value in participating in the 401(k) plan. This increased likelihood could be due to the experience of already having a plan and feeling confident in managing one's own assets. Since the PSID does not distinguish between offering a plan and worker eligibility, having another pension plan could also signal eligibility and hence a greater chance of participating.
We believe the consequences of omitting education, race, and gender from the regression are minor. Since income and education are known to be positively correlated, it is probable that simply controlling for family income is sufficient to capture educational effects. In addition, highly educated workers are more likely to have financially sophisticated time horizons for saving, as well as an appreciation for the value of saving and planning for retirement. These tastes for saving are captured in the unobservable effect, which is controlled for in our model.
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Gender has consistently been found to be statistically insignificant in previous participation models. 15 Furthermore, although a few studies have found that race affects participation, these effects are due to a lower confidence in financial investing and distrust in financial institutions, which would be captured in the unobservable effect.
16 
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CONCLUSIONS
We reject the hypothesis that inertia in contributions is the main motivating force.
Regression results show a positive, statistically significant effect of the level of the DJIA on 401(k) participation over time. We also find a low density and low persistence in contributions over a fairly short period of time. This result varies across demographic and economic groups in predictable ways, with workers in the same job over the period and with high education or high income having relatively high persistency, but other groups not having a high degree of persistency. Lack of persistency occurs when workers change jobs and when they don't.
Generally, lack of persistency because of job changes accounts for less than half of the lack of persistency among workers initially contributing to a pension. The degree of persistence varies over time, depending in part on the state of the stock market. It also depends on the length of the time period considered. Our findings of relatively little persistency, compared to other studies, occur in part because of the relatively long time period we examine (six years) and because of the volatility in the stock market over this period.
These findings have important implications for the functioning of the pension system, with its reliance on 401(k) plans. Projections of future retirement income readiness that assume that workers persistently contribute over their working lives greatly overstate the future levels of pension assets that workers will have accumulated. Our work suggests that perhaps many people participating in 401(k) plans will not have accumulated adequate resources because they will not have contributed to their plans a sufficient percentage of their adult working lives.
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APPENDIX JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CHOICE OF FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION
Theory suggests that the individual unobservable effect c i is likely correlated with at least one of the independent variables in Equation (2) . For example, if c i includes innate tastes for saving, a person's choice on whether to save and how much will affect the level of net worth and whether the person has another pension plan. If these unobserved effects are not controlled for (hence throwing them into the error term) estimating the model using pooled OLS will produce inconsistent estimates.
Using either fixed or random effects estimation will eliminate the unobserved effects and produce consistent estimates. However, while fixed effects estimates are consistent regardless of whether the independent variables are correlated with the unobserved effects, consistent estimates using random effects requires that the explanatory variables and the unobserved effects be uncorrelated. As detailed in the paragraph above, there are reasons to believe that c i is correlated with at least one of the explanatory variables. If this is the case, using random effects will produce inconsistent estimates.
To confirm the decision to use fixed effects, we conduct a Hausman test. The null hypothesis is that fixed and random effects produce estimates that are statistically the same, or that ρ=0. If we reject the null hypothesis, then the strict exogeneity assumption is violated and we should use fixed effects.
We estimate Equation (2) below using both fixed and random effects:
(2) y it = x it β + δ z t + c i + u it
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The results are reported in By looking at the estimates we can see a large difference between the random effects and fixed effects estimates. This observation is verified by computing the χ 2 statistic and comparing it to the critical value at two degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis is clearly rejected, at both a 1 and 5 percent level. We conclude that the estimates are statistically different, making random effects estimation inconsistent. Hence we choose to estimate the regression using fixed effects.
